Foreword

Baltasara Petronila Arce y Suárez was the only daughter of Fernando de Arce y Dávila and Baltasara Antonia Suárez Mosquera. She was born in Zalamea around the mid-17th century.[1] She married Juan Morales Arce y Reinoso who became Earl of Castille in 1691. Baltasara wrote a logic treatise published in Salamanca in 1692.[2] It is always difficult to determine who is the πρῶτος εὑρετής in any domain, but it may well be that Baltasara was the first woman who ever wrote a logical treatise that is still known to this day. Baltasara places a strong emphasis on dialectic in a treatise that is supposed to offer an exposition of logic according to the spirit of John Duns Scotus. In his seminal paper on the treatise,[3] M. Forlivesi found it surprising

[1] For biographical information, see L.P. Panzone, *The Debut of a Woman in the History of Logic: Baltasara Petronila Arce y Suárez's Tractatus logicae parvae iuxta mentem Scoti*, «Journal of the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists», 4/1 (2025), pp. 66-82.

[2] The volume was printed *apud Vm Lucae Perez, Typographam Universitatis*. Notably, its publisher was likewise a woman. All quotations refer to the pagination of the 1692 edition.

[3] Cf. M. Forlivesi, *Materiali per una descrizione della disputa e dell'esame di laurea in Età moderna*, in A. Ghisalberti (a cura di), *Dalla prima alla seconda*

that Baltasara would write a text *iuxta mentem doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti*, since she was a relative of the Dominican Diego Arce y Reinoso, who was close to the Portuguese Thomist Joâo Poinsot (1589-1644). I think that the treatise itself offers us a hint at a possible explanation. Several Franciscans wrote prefaces to the treatise, thereby showing that Baltasara was close to the Franciscan Order. Furthermore, Baltasara herself speaks of saint Francis of Assisi as "our Father Francis" in an example of the treatise. This could only be possible if she were a member of the Order, which brings me to hypothesize that she belonged to the so-called Third Order, which included also lay people. As a Franciscan herself, Baltasara might have had an interest in promoting a logic in the spirit of Duns Scotus. Scotus did not really contribute to argumentation theory and the alleged Scotistic character of the treatise consists rather in engaging with other logic handbooks written by Spanish Franciscans of her times. A further complication, as stressed by Lelio P. Panzone, is that at least one "Scotus" citation may conceal a reference to *Soto* rather than to the *Doctor subtilis*. The full title of the treatise runs as follows: *Tractatus logicae parvae, distributus in tribus libris iuxta mentem Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti* ("A treatise on little logic divided into three books, according to the mind of the Doctor John Duns Scotus"). After a dedication to the Duchess of Pastrana by Baltasara, the text is introduced by several endorsements ("approbationes") and by a preface by Baltasara, where she outlines the role and the rules of dialectic. In the final sentence of the text, we read that Baltasara terminated her manuscript on January the 6th, 1692. As the structure of the treatise shows, Baltasara is primarily interested in the dialectic nature of logic and her exposition of syllogistic is not along the lines of an axiomatic system, but rather centers around the problem of resolution of a given mood thanks to any of the methods of reduction and on the *inventio medii*, i.e., the so-called *pons asinorum*

Scolastica. Paradigmi e percorsi storiografici, Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2000, pp. 252-279.

doctrine that looks at arguments from an "analytic" perspective: given a certain conclusion, Aristotle presents methods to identify middle terms to single out premises that could yield the aforementioned conclusion (cf. *Prior Analytics*, A 28-32).[4] In what follows, I will be delving into the details of Baltasara's dialectic understanding of logic, her conception of the copula and her possible sources, to highlight the originality of her contribution to the history of logic. Throughout, I keep Latin citations and supply an English translation after each of them.

Before turning to Baltasara's text, it is important to stress how much the present research community owes to Lelio Paolo Panzone's editorial work. His volume offers, for the first time, the complete text of the *Tractatus* in a semi-diplomatic transcription and frames it with an introduction explicitly designed to orient readers both historically and philosophically. Panzone's introduction is organized around (i) Baltasara's figure, (ii) the seventeenth-century logical landscape, and (iii) the internal architecture and sources of the *Tractatus*, while also setting out clear editorial criteria and indicating promising lines for further inquiry. In short, the book is not merely a "text delivery," but a genuine methodological gateway into a terrain that remains largely unexplored within the historiography of logic.

Baltasara on Dialectic

In her *Preface*, Baltasara explains why she proposes a series of rules for dialectical debates before expounding the parts of logic. In her writings, she appears to be a devout Christian who believes that enlightenment comes from above in each scientific discipline so that the best preparation in any domain of inquiry is the practice of virtue. When we do logic, she says, we aim at grasping truth and truth becomes

[4] See M. Crubellier, *Platon sur le Pont aux ânes (Premiers Analytiques I 31)*, «Revue de philosophie ancienne», 25 (2017/2), pp. 99-136, for an excellent presentation of Aristotle's doctrine of the "pons asinorum".

more evident when contrasted with its opposite. Therefore, we should proceed dialectically, since dialectic enables us to compare truth with falsehood, carefully examine both, and discern the former more clearly.

> *Et cum scientia absque charitate sit vacua, pete ab ipso Iesu ante omnem scientiam, bonitatem morum et disciplinam, dicendo cum Rege Propheta, Psalm. 118 "Bonitatem, disciplinam et scientiam doce me". Haec est vera sapientia desursum descendens a Patre luminum. Et cum meum sit in Logica indagare veritatem, et veritas magis elucescit, dum fuerit maior oppositio, iuxta illud Philosophi axioma: "Opposita iuxta se opposita magis elucescunt". Et cum hoc solum competat argumentationi, visum fuit mihi proponere suas regulas, antequam explicem institutiones logicales (Prologus).*
>
> And since knowledge without charity is empty, ask from Jesus Himself, before every kind of knowledge, for goodness of conduct and discipline, saying with the Prophet King in Psalm 118: "Teach me goodness, discipline, and knowledge." This is true wisdom, descending from above from the Father of lights. And since it is my task in Logic to investigate truth, and truth shines forth more brightly when there is greater opposition, according to that axiom of the Philosopher: "Opposites placed beside opposites shine more clearly," and since this pertains properly to argumentation alone, it seemed fitting to me to set forth its rules before I explain the logical institutions.

This claim is not rhetorical padding: it explains why Baltasara begins with an exposition of the *modus disputandi*. Dialectic is not simply one component of logic: it is the practice through which logical knowledge is made vivid and manifest, precisely because it compels assertions to endure structured opposition. Baltasara presents her rules as common across "all schools." M. Forlivesi plausibly connects them with disputations in thesis defenses that preceded degree conferral. It is equally possible that she is also alluding to a broader pedagogical culture of regulated debates in early modern institutions. Her own formulation is unambiguous about the interpersonal nature of disputation:

> *Licet ad integritatem tractatus Logicae parvae non pertineat hoc caput, quia est utile tyronibus, ad hoc ut habeant integram notitiam, modum observandi ante disputationem, quod est commune in omnibus scholis; ideo visum fuit mihi, illum proponere, ut cum maiori facilitate eum sciant: et cum disputatio non possit esse, nisi inter duos, quorum unus erit proponens, alter vero respondens, et hac de causa erit inter illos sermo (ibidem).*
>
> Although this chapter does not belong to the integrity of the treatise on minor logic, it is useful for beginners so that they may have complete knowledge of the manner to be observed before disputation, which is common in all schools; therefore, it seemed good to me to expound it, so that they may know it more easily. And since disputation cannot be except between two, of whom one will be the proponent and the other the respondent, for that reason there will be discourse between them.

This already fixes two decisive features of her conception of dialectic.

a) *Dialectic is essentially interpersonal*. It is not an "internal language" operation but a regulated exchange between roles, with turns, permissions, and social norms.
b) *Dialectic is a norm-governed speech*. The pre-disputation ritual and the postures of objection and reply are not incidental: they belong to what makes truth "shine" through opposition.

Baltasara clearly refers to a real context with at least two agents, a *proponens* and a *respondens*. She does not have in mind any internal language situation. This becomes clearer with the following quote:

> *Si vero fuerit respondens, debet antequam egrediatur ad suam quæstionem, primo discoperto capite, captare veniam primo præsuli, secundo lectori, et sic de cæteris, secundum suam dignitatem: postea vero dicat: Quæstio, quæ in præsenti se offert ventilanda, inquirit hoc, vel hoc; circa quam difficultatem triplex, vel quadruplex versatur sententia... anteponendo auctoritates Sanctorum rationibus Aristotelis, et aliorum... et his finitis dicat: Hæc est mea conclusio: Si quis vestrum insurgere voluerit, paratus sum respondere ei,*

> *sub patrocinio mei præsidis: et quidquid dixi, aut dixero, inter respondendum sub pedibus Sanctæ romanæ ecclesia humiliter subijcio, necnon censuræ vestræ (ibidem).*
>
> If one is respondent, before going out to his question he should first uncover his head, ask leave first of the presiding officer, second of the lecturer, and so on according to each one's dignity; then he should say: the question now offered for examination inquires whether... about which difficulty threefold or fourfold opinions are found... preferring the authorities of the saints to the reasons of Aristotle and others... and when finished he should say: this is my conclusion; if any of you wishes to rise up, I am ready to respond under the patronage of my president; and whatever I said or shall say, I humbly submit beneath the feet of the Holy Roman Church and to your censure.

The emphasis on *auctoritates* (with the saints explicitly "before" Aristotle) matters for reading the *Tractatus* as a whole. Baltasara is not offering an autonomous "science of consequence" detached from theological authority: she is describing the *proper conduct* of scholastic disputation in a confessional context. This is one reason why her logic often looks less like a theory of formal systems and more like a pedagogy of argumentative performance: it is designed for *training* within an institution whose epistemic ideals include humility, obedience, and deference to the Church.

After the *respondens* has outlined their position, the *proponens* should react as follows:

> *Proponens vero eodem modo veniam capiat, et postea dicat: Adversus tuam conclusionem, in qua defendis hoc, vel hoc duplici, ut moris est, insurgam medio... et ponat syllogismum contra conclusionem prædictam... et dicat: Erit secundum contra talem conclusionem... Contra quam sic argumentor authoritate, vel ratione... His, et alijs pro acumine tui ingenij facile me satisfacies (ibidem).*
>
> The proponent likewise asks for permission and then says: "Against your conclusion (where you defend this or that) I will rise with a twofold objection, as is the custom"... and he should set down a syllogism against the said conclusion... and say: "There will

> be a second (argument) against such conclusion...". Against which I argue thus by authority or by reason... You will easily satisfy me about these and other points by the sharpness of your mind.

Two things deserve emphasis for an introduction to the treatise. First, *objection is structurally prioritized*: dialectic is not the occasional testing of an already finished doctrine; it is the very path by which doctrine is clarified. Second, the model is explicitly syllogistic ("*ponat syllogismum*"), but the goal is not merely to list valid moods: it is to make the respondent *exercise* the skills of distinguishing, conceding, denying, or dismissing, exactly the skills that later reappear in Baltasara's treatment of reduction and *inventio medii*.

The *respondens*' scheme of reply is as follows:

> *Respondens vero attente apprehendat syllogismum utriusque conclusionis... et tum videat, si est syllogismus, vel enthimema, et fideliter resumat... respiciendo primo ad maiorem, secundo ad minorem, postea ad consequentiam, et si in aliqua ex præmissis invenerit dubium, eam distinguat: si veram, eam concedat; si falsam, eam neget; si impertinens dicat transeat (ibidem).*
>
> The respondent should carefully grasp the syllogism for each conclusion... see whether it is a syllogism or an enthymeme and faithfully take it up... looking first to the major, second to the minor, then to the consequence; and if he finds doubt in any premise, let him distinguish it: if true, concede; if false, deny; if irrelevant, say "pass on".

This is a compact theory of dialectical rationality: (i) arguments are objects to be *taken up* and inspected; (ii) their appraisal is ordered (major/minor/consequence); (iii) the basic dialectical moves are concession, denial, distinction, and relevance-filtering. Put differently: Baltasara gives us, before anything else, a *normative micro-logic of debate*. Syllogistic is embedded in disputation practice, and the central question becomes not "what are the valid moods?" but "how do we *handle* a mood in live opposition?"

Baltasara on the Copula

Baltasara applies her own rules while discussing the status of the copula and criticizes the opinion of Pedro de Oña (Burgos 155?-Gaeta/Venezuela 1626) who maintained that the copula is a "term." In my opinion, this is one of the most philosophically intriguing parts of the treatise. In Baltasara's own opinion, which she opposes to the authority of Duns Scotus, a term is an extreme of a categorical proposition. Against those who argue that a term is a part of a proposition that has a meaning, Baltasara objects that in the proposition "*syndabsus non est blitiri*", "*syndabsus*" is a term.

> *Sed ut clariore luce istas rationes videatis illucescere, notate meam sententiam: Terminus Logicus in comuni est extremum propositionis cathegoricae. Haec definitio desumitur ex Aristotele 1 Prior. Cap. 1 tenetque eam Villalp. Lib. 1, Sum. Cap. 1 et ex Scotistis Rodriguez cap. 2 suae dialect. Mastr. Trat. 1, Fuent. Diffic. 1, illustriss. Merin. Vecenc. Ciorla Vullaer. Quatenus affirmant quoad rationem termini non requiritur significatio: illamque communiter defendunt Scotistae in suis manu scriptis (p. 4).*
>
> But so that you may see these arguments shine forth in a clearer light, note my position: a logical term in general is an extreme of a categorical proposition. This definition is taken from Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, chapter 1; and it is held by Villalpando, Book I of his *Summulae*, chapter 1, and among the Scotists by Rodríguez, chapter 2 of his *Dialectic*, Mastrius, treatise 1, de la Fuente, Difficultas 1, the most illustrious Merinero, Vecencio, Ciorla, Vullaer, insofar as they affirm that, with regard to the notion of a term, signification is not required; and the Scotists commonly defend this view in their manuscripts.

The quoted Rodríguez is Luis Rodríguez, author of a *Dialecticae Aristotelis compendium: commentaria, pluresque articuli, super logicam Ioannis Duns Scoti*, Salamanca: Ramirez, 1624. Rodríguez is quite clearly Baltasara's main source here. In ch.2 of his *Compendium*, he wrote:

> *Ex quibus deducitur primo, solam illam dictionem, quae per se potest esse subiectum aut predicatum, in propositione, verum esse terminum, sive sit significativa, sive non (p. 3).*
>
> From this it is first deduced that only that expression which, by itself, can be subject or predicate in a proposition is truly a term, whether it is meaningful or not.

Two clarifications are in order.

a) Baltasara's "term" is defined by its *role* in proposition, not by its semantic value. Therefore, nonsense-strings can count as terms: what matters is *extremity* (subject/predicate position), not signification.
b) This already pressures the status of the copula: if a "term" is an "extreme" of the syllogistic premise or of the conclusion, then *"est"* looks structurally unlike a term, unless it can be made to function as an extreme *in some special way*.

In her second question, Baltasara asks whether the "verbal copula", i.e., the "is" (*est*) that appears in any sentence in the standard form "S-is-P" is a term according to the above definition. In her summary, Pedro de Oña maintained that *"est"* is a term, whereas the opposite opinion has been maintained by Alphonsus a Malpartita, Rodríguez, and Mastrius and Bellutus. Her conclusion is as follows.

> *Copula, prout talis, est unio praedicati cum subiecto: sed unio praedicati cum subiecto non est nec subiectum, nec praedicatum: ergo, etc. Probatur minor a paritate. Sicut unio materiae et formae in composito substantiali non est pars compositi, ita nec unio praedicati cum subiecto est pars propositionis, sed solum est pars propositionis, quando induit rationem termini: ergo si non induit rationem partis, nec termini. Probatur secundo: Si copula, prout talis, esset vero terminus, propositio resolveretur in illa, tanquam in parte illius sed propositio nequit resolvi in illa: ergo non est terminus... sed copula post resolutionem propositionis non manet, sicut manebat in illius compositione: ergo propositio non potest resolvi in copula (p. 4)*
>
> The copula, as such, is the union of predicate with subject; but the union of predicate with subject is neither subject nor predicate;

> therefore (it is not a term). The minor is proved by comparison: just as the union of matter and form in a substantial composite is not a part of the composite, so the union of predicate and subject is not a part of the proposition—except when it takes on the character of a term. Hence, if it does not take on the character of a part, it does not take on the character of a term. It is proved secondly: if the copula, as such, were truly a term, the proposition would be resolved into it as into a part; but a proposition cannot be resolved into it; therefore, it is not a term... for each thing is resolved into what composes it; but after resolution the copula does not remain as it remained in the proposition's composition; therefore, the proposition cannot be resolved into the copula.

This is a strikingly "metaphysical" argument about a logical question, and it is also a revealing bridge between Baltasara's dialectic and her semantics. Her doctrine includes the following claims:

a) *copula = unio praedicati cum subiecto.* The copula is not an extreme but the *link* (a function of connection).
b) The hylomorphic analogy ("union of matter and form is not a part") supplies an ontological model for why the copula is not a "part" in the same way as the extremes are "parts" (and "terms").
c) The resolution test (*resolutio*) is methodological: what counts as a component is what remains after an analysis. If the copula "vanishes" under resolution (because resolution yields extremes and their modes), it cannot be a term *as such*.

At this point, it is helpful to notice how close Baltasara's view is to what later philosophers (and contemporary metaphysicians) would describe as a *copula-centered* account of predication. In the modern "presentism vs. temporal realism" debate, one of the cleanest strategies is *adverbialism*, where the time-index expressed by the tense does not affect the subject or the predicate, but the *copula*, i.e., the *way* in which the predicate is said of the subject. In my own work on Aristotle (cf. footnote 6, below), I defended the idea that tenses "*cosignify*" the

temporal qualification of the predicative *link*, not the subject or predicate as such. Read in this light, Baltasara's *unio* thesis can be made to do more philosophical work than a local dispute about whether *"est"* is a term. It suggests that:

a) Extremes are what logic identifies as the structural bearers of content in categorical form (even if non-significative).
b) The copula is not one more bearer of content but the *formal device* that makes predication happen at all. The "*est*" is precisely what can be modified (e.g., by modality; arguably also by tense) without turning into an "extreme."

This observation naturally raises a broader question: if the copula is understood as *unio*, how are we to interpret its "additions", i.e., modality, tense, and, in scholastic terminology, the *modus praedicandi*? In this respect, Can Laurens Löwe's analysis of Aquinas' theory of truth-makers is illuminating. Löwe's central concern is truthmaking and the structure of the *causa veritatis*. He argues that Aquinas articulates truth-makers at different levels (*esse rei*, *res*, *dispositio*, and *compositio*), thereby requiring a careful distinction between semantic articulation and metaphysical commitment.[5] Precisely such a distinction is presupposed in Baltasara's rejection of the copula as a term. The copula, insofar as it is the "union" of subject and predicate, performs a semantic-logical function within predication. This functional role should not be conflated with the ontological status of the entities signified by the extremes of the proposition. In Baltasara's opinion, Aristotle held her view in his remarks in *De Interpretatione*, 3:

> When uttered just by itself a verb is a name and signifies something – the speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses – but it does not yet signify whether it is or not. For not even 'to be' or 'not to be' is a sign of the actual thing (nor if you say simply 'that

[5] Cf. C.L. Löwe, *Sein, Sache, Ordnung: Thomas von Aquin über Wahrmacher und die Beziehung des Wahrmachens*, «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», 99(2), (2017), pp. 156-193.

> which is'); for by itself it is nothing, but it additionally signifies some combination, which cannot be thought of without the components (Arist., *De int.* 3, 16 b 19-25, revised Oxford translation, edited by J. Barnes).

The phrase "additionally signifies some combination" is exactly where the tradition will split: is εἶναι ("to be") primarily copulative, existential, or veridical? In my own discussion of Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, I maintained that Aristotle takes "is" to signify primarily the connection between a subject and a predicate, and that this connection has the additional function of expressing the temporal dimension in which the connection takes place.[6] The problem is quite complex and stems from Aristotle's text itself:

> A verb is what additionally signifies time, no part of it being significant separately; and it is a sign of things said of something else. It additionally signifies time: 'recovery' is a name, but 'recovers' is a verb, because it additionally signifies something's holding now. And it is always a sign of what holds, that is, holds of a subject. 'Does not recover' and 'does not ail' I do not call verbs [...]. Similarly, 'recovered' and 'will-recover' are not verbs but inflexions of verbs. They differ from the verb in that it additionally signifies the present time, they the time outside the present (Arist., *De int.* 3, 16 b 6-18, revised Oxford translation, edited by J. Barnes).

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[6] See L. Gili, *Tensing the Verbs*, in L. Gazziero (ed.), *Le langage. Lectures d'Aristote*, (Aristote. Traductions et études), Leuven-Paris-Bristol (CT): Peeters, 2021, pp. 143-171. I recently expanded these previous conclusions in L. Gili, *Un'interpretazione dialettica della nozione di "potenzialità" in Metafisica Θ, 1, 1046 a 9-15*, in S. Maso and C. Lo Casto (eds.), *Dibattiti antichi*, Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2025, pp. 29-44. My work is largely inspired by C.H. Kahn, *The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003, and by A. Moro, *The Raising of Predicates. Predicative Noun Phrases and the Theory of Clause Structure*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. For a different take on Aristotle's uses of "to be", see, among recent contributions, F. Ademollo, *De Interpetatione 3 on Isolated Verbs*, in A.P. Mesquita and R. Santos (eds.), *New Essays on Aristotle's Organon*, London/New York: Routledge, 2024, pp. 70-89 (according to Ademollo, "to be" has an existential value in *De Int.* 3, 16 b 6-18).

Aristotle ties verbs to the signification of time and to "holding of a subject," but he then says that past and future forms are not verbs proper: they are *derivative* inflexions, that are linguistically dependent on the present. This is precisely the point where Baltasara's question about the copula becomes philosophically intriguing. If tense "additionally signifies time," *what does it modify*? A tempting answer is that it modifies the world (so that past and future entities *exist*, if one grants that past and future sentences have a truth-value). A more economical answer is that it modifies the *predicative link*, i.e., tense qualifies the *unio* itself, not the extremes. This way of separating semantic strategy from ontological commitment also bears on the medieval debate about future contingents, because many medieval authors would grant that "tomorrow there will be a sea-battle" is a genuine truth-bearer, but only present events and substances *exist* in a full sense. In contemporary jargon, this is the adverbialist move: do not build time into the subject ("Caesar$_{\text{-at-t}}$ is P") or into the predicate ("Cesar is P$_{\text{-at-t}}$"), but into the copula ("is$_{\text{-at-t}}$"). In my book on *Aquinas on Change and Time*[7], I defended the usefulness of separating semantic analysis (how we *truthfully speak*) from metaphysical conclusions (what *exists*), and I explicitly associated this semantic strategy with E. J. Lowe's "adverbialism",[8] where the time-index is attached to the copula. In my opinion, Aquinas was likely analyzing the copula along these lines. The copula is not an extreme because it is not what the proposition is "about," it is what makes the proposition *say* something about something. The copula, precisely because it expands the "union", is the natural host for "additions" (modalities, tense, assertoric force) without thereby becoming a third "term". This reconstruction is not meant to attribute anachronistic metaphysical and semantic

[7] Cf. L. Gili, Aquinas on Change and Time. *A philosophical analysis of the commentary on Aristotle's "Physics" III and IV*, Baden Baden: Olms/Nomos Verlag, 2024, esp. pp. 47-52.

[8] Cf. E.J. Lowe, *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, esp. pp. 43-47.

ideas to Baltasara. It is rather meant to show why her apparently technical scholastic question ("*is the copula a term?*") connects directly to a cluster of philosophical problems that was dealt with by Aristotle, and that was at the center of later scholastic semantics, as it is at the core of contemporary debates about truth-makers and tensed truth. It also helps explain why Baltasara can be both (i) intensely dialectical in method and (ii) sharply discriminating about parts of a proposition: dialectic trains you to locate *where* in an opponent's claim the real pressure lies. In the copula dispute, the pressure point is exactly the status of the *predicative link*, whether it behaves like an extreme (a term) or like an operator that expresses the union of the extremes.

In closing, Baltasara Petronila Arce y Suárez deserves to be recognized not merely as a well-versed practitioner of late-scholastic logic, but as an original and philosophically intriguing logician in her own right. For this reason, Panzone's meticulous edition and contextual study are indispensable, as they invite scholars to write a fascinating new chapter in the history of logic.[9]

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