Is there any reason, for a realist to deny to artefacts the status of real objects inside an acceptable ontology? Is there any fundamental difference between artefacts and natural objects that could support such a claim? For natural entities it is widely accepted that there are scientific and technical classificatory systems. These constitute an improvement on our naïve classifications for they are the result of the progress of our knowledge on the nature of natural entities. Astonishingly it is not even taken into account the analogous possibility of a non-naïve classification for artefacts. In the most discussed antirealist arguments concerning artefacts a key role is played by the conception of artefacts kinds as functional kinds, but no characterization of what a function of an artefact is and of what it means for an artefact to have a function is provided. In the book antirealism is challenged, and it is proposed a way for improving our naïve knowledge of artefacts nature by way of a more refined notion of function that provide the taxonomical basis for a technical categorization of artefacts.

Marzia Soavi is a part-time researcher at the Departement of Philosophy at the University od Padova. In italian she has also published Antirealismo ed artefatti, Franco Angeli, Milano.



ISBN:9788861294356
Collana: Filosofia
Autore: Soavi Marzia
Edizione 2009
Stato: Disponibile